THE NECESSITY OF KNOWING GOD
AND HIS POWER.
Sect. 7.—BUT I will set your theology
before your eyes by a few similitudes.—What if any one, intending to compose a poem,
or an oration, should never think about, nor inquire into his abilities, what he could do,
and what he could not do, nor what the subject undertaken required; and should utterly
disregard that precept of Horace, "What the shoulders can sustain, and what they must
sink under;" but should precipitately dash upon the undertaking and think thus—I
must strive to get the work done; to inquire whether the learning I have, the eloquence I
have, the force of genius I have, be equal to it, is curious and superfluous:—Or, it
any one, desiring to have a plentiful crop from his land, should not be so curious as to
take the superfluous care of examining the nature of the soil, (as Virgil curiously and in
vain teaches in his Georgics,) but should rush on at once, thinking of nothing but the
work, and plough the seashore, and cast in the seed wherever the soil was turned up,
whether sand or mud:—Or if any one, about to make war, and desiring a glorious
victory, or intending to render any other service to the state, should not be so curious
as to deliberate upon what it was in his power to do; whether the treasury could furnish
money, whether the soldiers were fit, whether any opportunity offered; and should pay no
regard whatever to that of the historian, "Before you act, there must be
deliberation, and when you have deliberated, speedy execution;" but should rush
forward with his eyes blinded, and his ears stopped, only exclaiming war! war! and should
be determined on the undertaking:—What, I ask you, Erasmus, would you think of such
poets, such husbandmen, such generals, and such heads of affairs? I will add also that of
the Gospel—If any one going to build a tower, sits not down first and counts the
cost, whether he has enough to finish it,—What does Christ say of such an One? (Luke
xiv. 28-32).
Thus you also enjoin us works only. But you forbid us to examine, weigh, and know,
first, our ability, what we can do, and what we cannot do, as being curious, superfluous,
and irreligious. Thus, while with your over-cautious prudence you pretend to detest
temerity, and make a show of sobriety, you go so far, that you even teach the greatest of
all temerity. For, although the Sophists are rash and mad in reality while they pursue
their curious inquiries, yet their sin is less enormous than yours; for you even teach and
enjoin men to be mad, and to rush on with temerity. And to make your madness still
greater, you persuade us, that this temerity is the most exalted and Christian piety,
sobriety, religious gravity, and even salvation. And you assert, that if we exercise it
not, we are irreligious, curious, and vain: although you are so great an enemy to
assertions. Thus, in steering clear of Charybdis, you have, with excellent grace, escaped
Scylla also. But into this state you are driven by your confidence in your own talents.
You believe, that you can by your eloquence, so impose upon the understandings of all,
that no one shall discover the design which you secretly hug in your heart, and what you
aim at in all those your pliant writings. But God is not mocked, (Gal. vi. 7,) upon whom
it is not safe to run.
Moreover, had you enjoined us this temerity in composing poems, in preparing for
fruits, in conducting wars or other undertakings, or in building houses; although it would
have been intolerable, especially in so great a man, yet you might have been deserving of
some pardon, at least from Christians, for they pay no regard to these temporal things.
But when you enjoin Christians themselves to become rash workers, and charge them not to
be curious about what they can do and what they cannot do, in obtaining eternal salvation;
this, evidently, and in reality, is the sin unpardonable. For while they know not what or
how much they can do, they will not know what to do; and if they know not what to do, they
cannot repent when they do wrong; and impenitence is the unpardonable sin: and to this,
does that moderate and skeptical theology of yours lead us.
Therefore, it is not irreligious, curious, or superfluous, but essentially wholesome
and necessary, for a Christian to know, whether or not the will does any thing in those
things which pertain unto Salvation. Nay, let me tell you, this is the very hinge upon
which our discussion turns. It is the very heart of our subject. For our object is this:
to inquire what "Free-will" can do, in what it is passive, and how it stands
with reference to the grace of God. If we know nothing of these things, we shall know
nothing whatever of Christian matters, and shall be far behind all People upon the earth. He
that does not feel this, let him confess that he is no Christian. And he that despises and
laughs at it, let him know that he is the Christian's greatest enemy. For, if I know not
how much I can do myself, how far my ability extends, and what I can do God-wards; I shall
be equally uncertain and ignorant how much God is to do, how far His ability is to extend,
and what He is to do toward me: whereas it is "God that worketh all in all." (1
Cor. xii. 6.) But if I know not the distinction between our working and the power of God, I know not God Himself. And if I know not God, I cannot worship Him,
praise Him, give Him thanks, nor serve Him; for I shall not know how much I ought to
ascribe unto myself, and how much unto God. It is necessary, therefore, to hold the most
certain distinction, between the power of God and our power, the working of God and our
working, if we would live in His fear.
Hence you see, this point, forms another part of the whole sum of Christianity; on
which depends, and in which is at stake, the knowledge of ourselves, and the knowledge and
glory of God. Wherefore, friend Erasmus, your calling the knowledge of this point
irreligious, curious, and vain, is not to be borne in you. We owe much to you, but we owe
all to the fear of God. Nay you yourself see, that all our good is to be ascribed unto
God, and you assert that in your Form of Christianity: and in asserting this, you
certainly, at the same time assert also, that the mercy of God alone does all things, and
that our own will does nothing, but is rather acted upon: and so it must be, otherwise the
whole is not ascribed unto God. And yet, immediately afterwards, you say, that to assert
these things, and to know them, is irreligious, impious, and vain. But at this rate a
mind, which is unstable in itself, and unsettled and inexperienced in the things of
godliness, cannot but talk.
Sect. 8.—ANOTHER part of the sum of
Christianity is, to know, whether God foreknows any thing by contingency, or whether we do
all things from necessity. This part also you make to be irreligious, curious, and vain,
as all the wicked do: the devils , and the damned also, make it detestable and execrable.
And you shew your wisdom in keeping yourself clear from such questions, wherever you can
do it. But however, you are but a very poor rhetorician and theologian, if you pretend to
speak of "Free-will" without these essential parts of it. I will therefore act
as a whetstone, and though no rhetorician myself, will tell a famed rhetorician what he
ought to do—If, then, Quintilian, purposing to write on Oratory, should say, "In
my judgment, all that superfluous nonsense about invention, arrangement, elocution,
memory, pronunciation, need not be mentioned; it is enough to know, that Oratory, is the
art of speaking well"—would you not laugh at such a writer? But you act exactly
like this: for pretending to write on "Free-will," you first throw aside, and
cast away, the grand substance and all the parts of the subject on which you undertake to
write. Whereas, it is impossible that you should know what "Free-will" is,
unless you know what the human will does, and what God does or foreknows.
Do not your rhetoricians teach, that he who undertakes to speak upon any subject, ought
first to show, whether the thing exist; and then, what it is, what its parts are, what is
contrary to it, connected with it, and like unto it, &c.? But you rob that miserable
subject in itself, "Free will," of all these things: and define no one question
concerning it, except this first, viz., whether it exist: and even this with such
arguments as we shall presently see: and so worthless a book on "Free-will" I
never saw, excepting the elegance of the language. The Sophists, in reality, at least
argue upon this point better than you, though those of them who have attempted the subject
of "Free-will," are no rhetoricians; for they define all the questions connected
with it: whether it exists, what it does, and how it stands with reference to, &c.:
although they do not effect what they attempt. In this book, therefore, I will push you,
and the Sophists together, until you shall define to me the power of
"Free-will," and what it can do: and I hope I shall so push you, (Christ
willing) as to make you heartily repent that you ever published your Diatribe.
